By Mark Sainsbury
Frege is now considered as one of many world's maximum philosophers, and the founding father of sleek common sense. Mark Sainsbury argues that we needs to leave significantly from Frege's perspectives if we're to paintings in the direction of an enough perception of traditional language. this is often a very good contribution to philosophy of language and good judgment and should be precious to all these attracted to Frege and the philosophy of language.
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Extra resources for Departing from Frege: Essays in the Philosophy of Language (International Library of Philosophy)
1 Michael Dummett (1976: 69) characterizes a theory of meaning as a theoretical representation of the practical ability of knowing how to speak the language. John McDowell identifies understanding a language with the recognitional ability I invoke: “Understanding a language consists in the ability to know, when speakers produce utterances in it, what propositional acts, with what contents, they are performing” (1976: 45). McDowell imposes a structural constraint, but does not attempt to derive it from the requirement that a theory represent the recognitional ability.
IV “Russell on names and communication”. In Andrew Irvine and Gary Wedeking (eds) Russell and Analytic Philosophy, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993: 3–21. Reprinted with permission of University of Toronto Press. The volume collects papers presented at a conference on Russell held at the University of British Columbia, Vancouver, in 1992. Kripke (1972: 27) said that both Frege and Russell held that “a proper name, properly used, simply was a definite description abbreviated or disguised”.
This is a gap which could not open up within Frege’s position, for thoughts or judgements are senses, and, setting aside possible complications related to indexicality, anyone can in principle access any sense. The view which, I argue, Russell really advances is that definite descriptions can be used to give an account of what is going on in the mind of one who uses a name, and the right description may differ from speaker to speaker, and even for a given speaker from occasion to occasion. That is where the account of judgement stops.