By Justin Snedegar
Justin Snedegar develops and defends contrastivism approximately purposes. this can be the view that normative purposes are essentially purposes for or opposed to activities or attitudes merely relative to units of choices. easily placed, purposes are continuously purposes to do something instead of one other, rather than easily being purposes to do whatever, complete cease. paintings on purposes has turn into important to a number of parts of philosophy, but in addition to a few exceptions, this view has no longer been mentioned. Contrastive purposes makes the case that it is a mistake. Snedegar develops 3 sorts of arguments for contrastivism. First, contrastivism offers us the simplest account of our usual discourse approximately purposes. moment, contrastivism top is smart of frequent principles approximately what purposes are, together with the concept that they want the issues they're purposes for and the concept that they contain the promoting of definite varieties of goals. 3rd, contrastivism has appealing functions in several parts of normative philosophy within which purposes are vital. those contain debates in normative ethics approximately no matter if higher than will be intransitive and debates in either epistemology and useful reasoning in regards to the rationality of withholding or postponing trust and intention. Read more...
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Extra resources for Contrastive reasons
This is a more conservative view than deep contrastivism, according to which the contrastive relation expressed by ‘reason’ is the important normative relation, and is not to be analyzed in terms of a deeper non-contrastive normative relation. However, after sketching shallow contrastivism, I’ll argue that the normative favoring relation itself is contrastive, so that we should adopt deep contrastivism. This is the second step in developing contrastivism. The theory, as it stands after Chapter , is that reasons to A, out of a set of alternatives Q, are facts that favor A-ing out of Q.
But in fact there’s reason to question Exclusivity. Suppose I love to talk to famous people, but hate to be snubbed. And suppose that, unfortunately, famous people are likely to snub guys like See Dancy (: ) for discussion. OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, //, SPi re as on c l ai m s me. Then the fact that the person across the bar is famous is a reason for me to go to talk to her, since I love to talk to famous people. But it’s also a reason for me not to go to talk to her, since I hate to be snubbed, and since famous people are likely to snub guys like me.
I don’t claim to have shown that Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument to the best explanation cannot work. To salvage the argument, we would need to show that, even though contrastivism about ‘ought’ or justification neither requires nor is required by contrastivism about reasons, his explanation is nevertheless the best one. One challenge here is that the views I described that accept contrastivism about ‘ought’ or justification without accepting I will return to this example in Chapter . OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, //, SPi c on t r as t i v i sm an d re as on s contrastivism about reasons seem very reasonable, and I’m not sure what evidence we could marshal in favor of the views that accept contrastivism about both ‘ought’/justification and reasons over these, beyond giving direct arguments for contrastivism about reasons.